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1. Introduction
This article is concerned with the way in which different types of speech 
act evaluations are lexicalized by speech act verbs and speech act idioms. 
We first distinguish different types of explicit and implicit evaluations 
which may be lexicalized by speech act verbs. The meanings of speech act 
verbs in German, English and Dutch are compared to examine which types 
of evaluations are lexicalized in each of these languages. Having 
established an inventory of evaluation types lexicalized by speech act 
verbs, we compare the evaluations lexicalized by speech act verbs with 
those lexicalized by speech act idioms. Particularly, we shall ask ourselves 
whether certain types of evaluations may be lexicalized by idioms rather 
than by verbs, and if so, whether this phenomenon also holds cross- 
linguistically. We shall also examine whether those evaluations typically 
expressed by speech act idioms are the same in German, English and 
Dutch.
2. Two specific properties of the semantics of speech act verbs
The representation of the meaning of speech act verbs requires semantic 
categories different from those needed for that of other verb classes such as 
causatives and verbs of vision or motion. This is due to the following two 
properties specific to the semantics of speech act verbs.
(l)The use of speech act verbs involves two types of situations. The first is 
one in which a speaker uses a speech act verb to refer to a speech act 
performed by another speaker. This situation type is called the 
“discourse situation (DS)” and contains three situation roles: a speaker, 
a hearer and an utterance which, in the prototypical case, contains a 
proposition. The second situation type is the one the discourse situation 
speaker refers to by using a speech act verb. The latter type of situation 
is called the “resource situation" (RS). Like the discourse situation, the 
resource situation contains the roles of a speaker, a hearer and an 
utterance containing a proposition (cf. Barwise/Perry 1983, Har- 
ras/Winkler 1994):
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Discourse situation Resource situation
Figure 1. Two types of situations
When a speech act verb is used performatively, the discourse and the 
resource situation coincide.
(2) Speech act verbs lexicalize configurations of attitudes of the RS speaker. 
These include propositional attitudes as well as speaker intentions and 
speaker presuppositions (cf. Searle/Vanderveken 1985, Vanderveken 
1990, Harras 2001). The propositional attitude of a speaker is the 
attitude of that speaker towards the propositional content of his 
utterance. In the case he asserts p, he takes p for true (epistemic 
attitude), in the case he promises p or asks someone to do p, he wants p 
(attitude of wanting), or in the case he praises or blames someone for p, 
he evaluates p positively or negatively (evaluative attitude). On the 
whole, the attribute of the RS speaker’s propositional attitude may be 
assigned one of the following values:
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S takes for S wants: S finds: p S finds: p S feels joy,
true: (not) p 
S knows:
(not) p good/ bad sorrow, anger
(not) p 
assertive directive and verhs nf expressive expressive
speech act commissive grading speech act speech act verhs
verhs speech act 
verhs
verbs
assert ask, promise, grade praise, complain, klagen
inform bitten, einordnen blame,
mitteilen versprechen loben, tadeln
Figure 2. Values for the RS speaker’s propositional attitudes
The intentional attitude of the RS speaker is related to the RS hearer’s 
reaction. The possible values for the attribute of the speaker’s intention are: 
S wants H to do or not to do p (ask, prohibit), S wants H to take p for true 
(assert) or false (deny), S wants H to know p (inform), S wants H to 
recognise that S evaluates p positively (praise) or negatively (criticize), S 
wants H to recognize that S is in a particular mental state (complain).
Apart from these two attitudes, speech act verbs lexicalize presupposi-
tions of the RS speaker. These correspond to the preparatory conditions 
which have to be fulfilled if a given speech act is to be performed 
successfully and non-defectively (cf. Searle and Vanderveken 1985, 
Vanderveken 1990). The presuppositions of the RS speaker concern the 
expectability of p, the field of interest of p and the presupposed attitude of 
H:
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expectable: 
(not) p
warnen, warn
verbieten,
prohibit
in the interest of S: 
(not) p
in the interest of H: 
(not) p
request, verbieten 
promise
H takes for true: 
(not) p
H knows: (not) p
deny, bestatigen 
ask, inform
Figure 3. Values for the RS speaker’s presuppositions
For some speech act verbs, the propositional content may be con-
strained in several ways: the use of the verb announce ist restricted to 
future events; the use of request is restricted to a future action of the RS 
hearer, the use of promise is restricted to a future action of the RS speaker 
and so on.
3. The lexicalization of evaluations by speech act verbs
Of the three types of attitudes mentioned above (i.e. the RS speaker’s 
propositional attitude, the RS speaker’s intention and the RS speaker’s 
presuppositions), two are relevant to the lexicalization of speech act 
evaluations:
( 1 ) the propositional attitude of the RS speaker 
(2) the presuppositions of the RS speaker
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Speaker intentions are not relevant, because they involve propositional 
attitudes. For example, the verbs ask and prohibit lexicalize the intentional 
attitude ‘S wants H to do p /not to do p)’, which contains the propositional 
attitude ‘S wants p /not p)’. The evaluation of p as something which is 
desirable/ undesirable for S is a genuine propositional attitude and only an 
indirect part of the speaker’s intention.
In those cases where the RS speaker’s propositional attitude is 
evaluative, the evaluations expressed by the corresponding verbs are 
explicit. This is true of expressive speech act verbs like German 
loben/tadeln!kritisieren, English praise/blame/criticize and Dutch
prijzen/berispen/kritiseren (cf. Zillig 1982). Explicit evaluations can also be 
part of the discourse situation: they are evaluations by a DS speaker of a RS 
speaker’s speech act. Evaluations like these are lexicalized by the following 
verbs: German angeben/sich aufspielen (English boast, Dutch
opscheppen/bluffen) and German schwindeln and flunkern (English fib, 
Dutch jokken) as opposed to lügen (English lie, Dutch liegen).
Speech act verbs may also lexicalize implicit evaluations. These are 
expressed by utterances containing directive or commissive speech act 
verbs like German auffordern (English request, Dutch vragen) or German 
versprechen (English promise, Dutch beloven) (cf. Zillig 1982; Fries 1991). 
auffordern (request/ vragen) is used to refer to situations where the speaker 
considers the action p desirable for him- or herself, while versprechen 
(promise, beloven) is used to refer to situations where the speaker considers 
the action p desirable for the hearer. Although these implicit evaluations 
are part of the preparatory conditions of the corresponding speech acts, they 
do not constitute lexical presuppositions. However, the verbs warnen/ 
warn! waarschuwen are both exceptions to this general fact, because 
sentences involving these verbs presuppose a negative evaluation of an 
expectable event.
On the whole, we get the following possiblities for evaluations 
lexicalized by speech act verbs:see figure 4.
The semantic difference between speech act verbs lexicalizing 
evaluations as elements of a discourse situation and those lexicalizing 
evaluations as elements of a resource situation is that evaluations which are 
elements of a resource situation can be cancelled by a DS speaker, while 
such which are elements of a discourse situation cannot. Sequences of 
utterances such as the following seem to be quite coherent:
(1) Hans hat Anton dafür getadelt, dass er ins kalte Wasser gesprungen ist, aber bei 
der Hitze war das das einzig Richtige.
(2) John blamed Anthony for having jumped into the cold water, but in this heat it 
was just the right thing to do.
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(3) Hans hat Anton dafür getadelt, dass er ins kalte Wasser gesprungen ist, dabei 
hat Anton nur ein Fußbad genommen.
(4) John blamed Anthony for having jumped into the cold water, but he only took a
foot bath.
The examples show that the DS speaker can - from his point of view - 
cancel the supposed evaluation (in this case: ‘jumping into the cold water is 
bad’) as well as the presupposed event of Anthony’s jumping into the cold 
water. We can conclude that, like the cognitive verbs glauben, believe, 
geloven, these expressive speech act verbs have two uses: a de re use where 
the DS speaker shares the attitudes of the RS speaker and a de dicto use 
where the DS speaker only reports the attitudes of the RS speaker without 
sharing them (cf. Lakoff 1970; Fillmore 1973; Wunderlich 1973).
Figure 4. Different kinds of evaluations
It is quite clear that supposed evaluations which are elements of the 
discourse situation cannot be cancelled by a DS speaker without getting 
into a kind of Moorean paradoxon. The following utterances are defective 
in much the same way as an utterance like The cat is on the mat, but I  don 7 
believe it is:
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(5) *Hans hat mächtig mit seinem Auto angegeben, aber ohne zu übertreiben
(6) *John boasted enormously about his car, but without exaggeration
Apart from some rare examples such as those instantiated by warnen 
(English warn, Dutch waarschuwen), evaluations which are part of a RS 
speaker’s presuppositions do not constitute lexical presuppositions. Verbs 
like German auffordern and bitten, English request and ask or Dutch 
vragen en verzoeken lexicalize the RS speaker’s propositional attitude ,S 
wants: p‘ with the implicit positive evaluation ,p is in the interest of S‘, but 
the negation test for the corresponding lexical presuppositions fail, cf.:
(7) Hans hat Anton nicht aufgefordert, die Tür zu schließen
(8) John did not ask Anthony to close the door
(9) Hans heeft Tony niet gevraagd de deur te sluiten
In all these cases, there is nothing left to be presupposed concerning the 
attitudes of a RS speaker: attitudes of speakers do not exist in the world 
before the corresponding speech act is performed. Rather, they are 
introduced by the utterance itself, and in the case that there is no request at 
all, there are no speaker attitudes either. As Searle has pointed out: speech 
acts create social facts, and this is reflected by the semantic behavior of 
speech act verbs.
One definition of possible non-lexical presuppositions of sentences 
containing speech act verbs has been proposed by Chierchia and 
McConnell-Ginet. These authors define non-lexical presuppositions of 
sentences containing speech act verbs in terms of context-dependency (cf. 
Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1990):
A sentence S presupposes B relative to a set of premises P iff 
S can be felicitously uttered in a context c in which premises P hold 
only if c entails B.
P includes premises about human behaviour, elements of Gricean practical 
reasonings and other more specific premises about a state of affairs (cf. 
Kadmon 2001). The definition covers cases where a pragmatic, i.e. 
conversationally triggered, presupposition may arise in some contexts and 
fail to arise in others. The difference between conversationally triggered 
and lexical presuppositions is that lexical presuppositions such as those 
contained in sentences with verbs like aufhören (English stop, Dutch 
ophouden) contribute to the truth value of utterances, while conversatio-
nally triggered presuppositions do not. The utterance
(10) John promised Bill to come to the party 
has the conversational implicature in (10’):
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(10’) Bill wants John to come to the party.
This conversational implicature arises in such contexts in which (11) holds:
(11) People perfom speech acts only if they take it for granted that the 
preparatory conditions of these hold true. (cf. Kadmon 2001).
(11) determines the contexts in which (10’) constitutes a pragmatic 
presupposition. The interpretation of (10) as containing (10’) is a preferred, 
i.e. default, interpretation, but (10) may be true if (10’) is not the case. 
(10’) constitutes a generalized implicature, which is part of the presumptive 
meaning of the utterance (cf. Levinson 2001). The pragmatic account 
clearly shows that the preparatory conditions of speech acts do not manifest 
themselves as lexical presuppositions of the corresponding speech act 
verbs.
The rare cases where the negation test for lexical presuppositions does 
not fail are the verbs warnen (English warn, Dutch waarschuwen) and 
ermahnen, cf.:
(12) Hans hat Anton nicht vor dem Unwetter gewamt
(13) John did not warn Anthony of the thunderstorm
(14) Hans heeft Tony niet voor het onweer gewaarschuwd
(15) Hans hat Anton nicht ermahnt, das Manuskript heute abzugeben
In the examples (12)-( 14) the referent of the prepositional phrases vor dem 
Unwetter, o f the thunderstorm, voor het onweer constitutes an existential 
presupposition, and therefore it cannot be cancelled by negation. In (15), 
Anton’s obligation of doing something {Manuskript abgeberi) is lexically 
presupposed as a result of a past request of Hans or some other person, and 
consequently, an implicit positive evaluation (,p is in the interest of Hans or 
some other person1) is presupposed as well. Both the natural event of a 
thunderstorm and the social event of a past request are facts of the external 
world. They are independent of the performance of any act and therefore 
constitute real lexical presuppositions.
4. The lexicalization of evaluations by idiomatic speech act expressions
Having shown that the evaluations expressed by speech act verbs are either 
explicit or implicit, we will now take a closer look at explicit evaluations, 
especially those lexicalized by idiomatic speech act expressions. We shall 
be concerned with the question of whether the evaluations lexicalized by 
idiomatic speech act expressions of the category ‘verb’ differ from those 
expressed by speech act verbs. Particularly, we shall ask ourselves whether 
there are specific types of evaluations which only idiomatic expressions can 
express and, if so, whether these are identical in different languages.
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It has often been suggested that idiomatic expressions (i.e. lexical 
expressions showing a certain degree of idiomaticity such as idioms and 
collocations) express speaker attitudes, often including an evaluation, to the 
situation referred to (cf. Cemyseva 1984 and 1989, Dobrovol’skij 1988, 
Schindler 1993, Fleischer 1997). As we have shown in the first part of this 
paper, speech act verbs differ from most other semantic classes in that they 
express speaker attitudes, often including speaker evaluations, as an 
essential part of their meaning. If idiomatic expressions in general typically 
express speaker attitudes and evaluations as well, it is not clear how the 
meanings of such idiomatic expressions which refer to speech acts differ 
from those of speech act verbs.
In spite of the wide-spread view that idioms and collocations typically 
express speaker attitudes, there are quite a few idiomatic speech act 
expressions which do not lexicalize any such attitude. This is especially 
true of such idioms and collocations making reference to conversational 
structure (e.g. broach the subject, canvass the idea (that)), a particular 
mode of communication (e.g. drop sb. a line) or a specific manner of 
speaking (e.g. German in Raten sprechen -  meaning ‘stutter’). Still, the 
majority of speech act idioms and collocations do express a certain speaker 
attitude, doing justice to the idea that the meaning of idiomatic expressions 
is characterized by a certain degree of “subjectivity”. In the light of the fact 
that this holds true of speech act verbs too, the claim that idiomatic 
expressions typically express speaker attitudes at least requires some 
specification as far as speech act expressions are concerned. We shall 
illustrate what is specific about the meaning of idiomatic speech act 
expressions (as opposed to speech act verbs) by means of the lexicalization 
of the concepts (TO) LIE and (TO) BOAST.
4.1. Verbs and idiomatic expressions lexicalizing the concept (TO) LIE
The evaluations expressed by idiomatic speech act expressions are 
primarily elements of the discourse situation. Examples are provided by the 
German word field which centres around the verb lügen {lie). The verb 
lügen {lie) does not by itself lexicalize any type of evaluation, though it 
does, of course, express a particular attitude on the part of the speaker. 
Specifically, the verb lügen/lie is used where a RS speaker does not take the 
proposition of his utterance to be true, while at the same time wishing that 
the RS hearer does take it to be true. This means that the attitude of the 
speaker towards the proposition is epistemic in nature, and not evaluative, 
as in the case of tadeln {reprimand). Neither does the meaning of lügen/lie 
involve any evaluative presupposition, the only presupposition of the 
speaker being that the hearer does not know p (cf. Figure 5):
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lügen (lie)
PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE: S does not take to be true: p 
SPEAKER’S INTENTION: S wants: H take to be true: p 
- SPEAKER’S PRESUPPOSITION: H does not know: o
Figure 5. speaker attitudes lexicalized by lügen/lie (S-Speaker', H -H earer’, 
p='proposition')
The word field centring around the German verb lügen (lie, liegen) 
includes other verbs like flunkern and schwindeln (both equivalents of 
English fib) and may be expanded by the presence of idiomatic expressions. 
All of these inherit the speaker attitudes lexicalized by lügen, but unlike the 
verb lügen itself, they seem to lexicalize some kind of evaluation by the DS 
speaker of the speech act performed by the RS speaker. Particularly, these 
verbs and complex expressions lexicalize the DS speaker's evaluation of 
the gravity of the lie. When the DS speaker wants to emphasize the RS 
speaker’s insincerity, he can choose from a wide range of options including 
lügen wie gedruckt (Tie as if it were printed’), lügen, dass sich die Balken 
biegen (Tie until the beams bend’) and jmdm. die Jacke/die Hucke voll 
lügen (Tie until somebody’s pockets are filled’). Additionally, it is possible 
for the DS speaker to specify the source of the gravity of the lie by focusing 
on single components of the idiom's meaning, such as the directness of the 
act of lying (jmdm. ins Gesicht lügen -  lie sb. straight into the face) or the 
impossibility for the proposition to come true (das Blaue vom Himmel 
herunter lügen- Tie the blue down from heaven’). Though attributes like 
‘specification of the proposition’ or ‘manner of speech act performance’ are 
not by themselves evaluations, the values attributed to them (e.g. ‘direct’ or 
‘unrealistic’) are. The images used in these idioms serve to emphasize the 
intensity of the act of lying. Apparently, acts of lying which are judged to 
be particularly serious cannot be referred to by verbs.
However, in such cases where the DS speaker considers the lie to be of a 
rather more facetious nature, his choice of expressions to refer to the 
corresponding act ranges from verbs like flunkern and schwindeln (both 
meaning ‘fib’) to true idioms like jmdn. auf den Arm nehmen (‘to take sb. 
onto one’s arm’). In these cases too, the proposition may be specified by 
the use of a particular image which emphasizes the innocence of the lie 
(e.g. ein X für ein U -  ‘X instead of U’), but apparently, only idioms and 
not verbs are used to express this kind of specification.
Whenever the act of lying is judged as neither particularly severe nor 
particularly innocent, both verbs and idiomatic expressions may be used 
(e.g. lügen -  lie and jmdm. einen Bären aufbinden).
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Summarizing what has been said so far, a DS speaker describing an act 
of lying can basically choose between words and idiomatic expressions, 
except in such cases where he believes the RS speaker to be particularly 
insincere. In such cases, the DS speaker can only choose from a range of 
idiomatic expressions (cf. Figure 6).
liigen (lie) and related idiomatic expressions (German)
Attenuation
{flunkern, 
schwindeln, jmdn. 
auf den Arm nehmen}
|+ Specification of p| 
(p unrealistic)
{jmdm. blauen Dunst 
vormachen, jmdm. ein 
Xfür ein U vormachen}
Intensification Neutral
{lügen wie gedruckt, 
lügen, dass sich die Balken 
biegen, jmdm. die Jacke/die 
Hucke voll lügen}
{lügen, jmdm. einen 
Bären aufl>inden, 
jmdm. etw. weismachen}
|+Manner]
(directly)
{jmdm. ins 
Gesicht lügen}
[+Specification of p) 
(p unrealistic)
{das Blaue vom Himmel 
herunter lügen}
Figure 6. Degrees of intensity lexicalized by lügen (lie) and related idiomatic 
expressions (German) - (p='proposition'; H='Hearer')
A comparison of Figure 6 with Figures 7 and 8 shows that, on the 
whole, the lexical field around lie yields the same picture in English and 
Dutch as it does in German: intensifications of the meaning of lie are 
lexicalized by idiomatic expressions, while such lies which are judged to be 
less innocent or neither innocent nor serious may be referred to by verbs 
and idiomatic expressions alike. Single conceptual components, such as the 
manner in which the act of lying is performed or some kind of specification 
of p (the proposition), may be lexicalized as well. In spite of these 
similarities, the three languages differ with respect to the values assigned to 
attributes like ‘Manner’ or ‘Specification of p ’. German, for example, does 
not seem to allow the lexicalization of the value ‘harmless’ for the 
parameter ‘Specification of p’. However, the various degrees of intensity 
are lexicalized in all three languages, and intensifications of the meaning of 
lie are consistently lexicalized by idioms, not by verbs. This is also true of
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specifications of the proposition, no matter whether these emphasize the 
severity or the innocence of the lie (cf. Figures 7 and 8).
lie and related idiomatic expressions (English)
Intensification Neutral Attenuation
{lie, tell sb. a lie} {fib, tell sb. a fib }
|+Manner] ^Specification of p)
(p harmless)
{lie sb. flat!straight into {tell sb. a white lie}
the face, tell sb. a barefaced 
lie, lie one's head off}
Figure 7. Degrees of intensity lexicalized by lie and related idiomatic expressions (English) • 
(p-proposition': H='Hearer')
liegen (lie) and related idiomatic expressions (Dutch)
Intensification Neutral Attenuation
{liegen dat je barst/ 
dat je zwart ziet/ 
dat je het zelf gelooft/ 
alsof het gedrukt Staat}
{liegen, iem.iets 
wijsmaken, iem. iets 
op de mouw spelden}
{jokken}
Figure 8. Degrees of intensity lexicalized by liegen (lie) and related 
idiomatic expressions (Dutch)
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Bearing this pattern in mind, we shall turn the concept BOAST and the way 
it is lexicalised in German, English and Dutch.
4.2. Verbs and idiomatic expressions lexicalizing the concept (TO) BOAST
Unlike the verb lügen {lie, liegen), verbs like angeben, prahlen, protzen and 
aufschneiden (English boast, brag and vaunt) do lexicalize speaker 
evaluations. Some of these are elements of the resource situation. Verbs 
like angeben/boast are used to refer to the behavior of a RS speaker who 
evaluates his own past actions positively and also wishes that the RS hearer 
recognize this. Thus, a sentence containing a verb like angeben/boast 
supposes a positive evaluation of the proposition (p) by the RS speaker. At 
the same time, the RS speaker presupposes p to be the case, reflecting the 
fact that angeben is a factive verb (see Figure 9).
angeben (boast)
- PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE: S evaluates: p good 
SPEAKER’S INTENTION: S wants: H recognize: p good
- SPEAKER’S PRESUPPOSITION: p is the case
Figure 9. Speaker attitudes lexicalized by angeben/boast (S='Speaker', H='Hearer', 
p='proposition')
Other evaluations lexicalized by verbs like angeben are elements of the 
discourse situation. A
A DS speaker uses these verbs to indicate that he considers the RS 
speaker’s positive evaluation of his own past actions to be exaggerated. 
Like the RS speaker’s positive evaluation, the negative evaluation by the 
DS speaker is part of the lexical meaning of boast.
All of the idiomatic expressions lexicalizing the concept (TO) BOAST 
inherit both types of evaluations expressed by verbs like angeben. As 
Figures 1 0 - 1 2  show, English, Dutch and German all possess idiomatic 
expressions which may be seen as synonyms of verbs like boast and do not 
lexicalize a degree of intensity significantly different from that expressed 
by the corresponding verbs. Moreover, attenuations of the concept (TO) 
BOAST do not seem to allow for lexicalizations in any of these languages. 
German permits the lexicalization of intensifications of (TO) BOAST, 
while intensifications of (TO) BOAST are not as clearly marked in English 
and Dutch. In German, clear intensifications of the meaning of angeben are
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expressed only by idiomatic expressions, meaning that these German 
idiomatic expressions lexicalize an evaluation of degree apart from the 
evaluations which they inherit from the verb angeben itself. Clearly, 
evaluations of degree are also elements of the discourse situation: the DS 
speaker considers the RS speaker’s evaluation of his own past actions to be 
far too positive.
angeben (boast) and related idiomatic expressions (German)
Intensification Neutral Attenuation
{angeben, prahlen, protzen, -
aufschneiden, sich in die 
Brust werfen, den Mund (zu) voll 
nehmen, große Reden schwingen, 
eine Stange angeben}
Figure 10. Degrees of intensity lexicalized by angeben and related idiomatic 
expressions (German)
boast and related idiomatic expressions (English)
{angeben wie ein Wald 
voll Affenlwie eine Tüte 
Mücken, kräftig/mächtig 
ins Horn stoßen}
Intensification Neutral Attenuation
{boast, brag, show off 
blow one's own trumpet, 
give oneself airs}
^Specification of P] 
(Contents)
{air/parade one’s knowledge}
Figure II. Degrees of intensity lexicalized by boast and related idiomatic 
expressions (English)
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opscheppen (boast) and related idiomatic expressions (Dutch)
Intensification Neutral Attenuation
-  {bluffen, opscheppen, -
zich op de borst slaan/ 
kloppen, een hoge borst 
opzetten, dik doen}
Figure 12. Degrees of intensity lexicalized by opscheppen and related 
idiomatic expressions (Dutch)
Here again, intensifications of evaluative meaning components are 
lexicalized by idiomatic expressions if they are lexicalized at all. This 
means that, on the whole, the lexicalization of the concept (TO) BOAST 
seems to follow the same pattern as that of (TO) LIE.
This pattern surfaces in other speech act word fields, especially in the 
sets of lexical expressions lexicalizing speech acts involving a negative 
evaluation by the RS or the DS speaker. Negative evaluations are obviously 
involved in concepts like REPRIMAND, CRITICIZE and BOAST, but 
they may also come into play when a DS speaker comments on acts of 
lying, promising or requesting. In cases like these, the DS speaker may 
express negative evaluations like his estimation of the gravity of the act of 
lying, the improbability that S will keep his promise, or the obtrusiveness of 
requesting acts. Idiomatic expressions typically lexicalize intensifications 
of such negative evaluations. Concepts of communication involving a 
positive evaluation (e.g. PRAISE) do not seem to be affected by this pattern 
(cf. Proost 2001a and 2001b). This does not mean though that verbs cannot 
lexicalize intensifications or evaluations by a DS speaker. However, when 
this is possible (e.g. German ausfragen- ausquetschen (wie eine Zitrone), 
English question -  pump, Dutch uitvragen), there are idiomatic expressions 
lexicalizing an even higher degree of intensity (e.g. German jmdn. in die 
Mangel nehmen - jmdm. Daumenschrauben anlegen, Dutch iemand op de 
roosterlde pijnbank leggen -  iem. de duimschroeven aandraaien, English 
put the srews on sb.). In cases like these, idiomatic expressions seem to 
cluster around the extreme negative end of the evaluation scale. This 
pattern holds for those idiomatic speech act expressions which can be 
classified as belonging to one of the traditional speech act classes.
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5. Conclusion
Our observations concerning the lexicalization of speech act evaluations in 
English, Dutch and German suggest that all types of explicit and implicit 
evaluations are represented in each of these languages. Both types of 
evaluations may be lexicalized by speech act verbs. Moreover, the set of 
expressions we can choose from to lexicalize a particular speech act can be 
expanded by idiomatic expressions. Idiomatic expressions lexicalize 
explicit evaluations. In each of the languages under consideration, 
idiomatic expressions as well as verbs lexicalize degrees of intensity, while 
intensifications, specifications of p and modes of speech act performance 
are primarily if not uniquely lexicalized by idiomatic expressions. 
Intensifications and attribute values like ‘unrealistic’ and ‘direct’ are 
specific to idioms. The three languages considered here differ in the way in 
which p is specified or in the particular manner of speech act performance. 
Not all types of specifications and modes of performance which are 
possible in principle are realized in each of the three languages 
investigated. The same is true of degrees of intensity: not all degrees which 
may be lexicalized in one language need automatically be lexicalized in 
other languages as well.
Abbreviations
S Speaker
H Hearer
p Proposition
RS Resource Situation
DS Discourse Situation
SRS Resource Situation Speaker
Hr s Resource Situation Hearer
pRS proposition of the RS speaker’s speech act
S ds  Discourse Situation Speaker
Hds Discourse Situation Hearer
pDS proposition of the DS speaker’s speech act
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